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Decades of research on human fertility has presented a clear picture of how
fertility varies, including its dramatic decline over the last two centuries
in most parts of the world. Why fertility varies, both between and within
populations, is not nearly so well understood. Fertility is a complex phenom-
enon, partly physiologically and partly behaviourally determined, thus an
interdisciplinary approach is required to understand it. Evolutionary
demographers have focused on human fertility since the 1980s. The first
wave of evolutionary demographic research made major theoretical and
empirical advances, investigating variation in fertility primarily in terms
of fitness maximization. Research focused particularly on variation within
high-fertility populations and small-scale subsistence societies and also
yielded a number of hypotheses for why fitness maximization seems
to break down as fertility declines during the demographic transition.
A second wave of evolutionary demography research on fertility is now
underway, paying much more attention to the cultural and psychological
mechanisms underpinning fertility. It is also engaging with the complex,
multi-causal nature of fertility variation, and with understanding fertility
in complex modern and transitioning societies. Here, we summarize the
history of evolutionary demographic work on human fertility, describe the
current state of the field, and suggest future directions.
1. Introduction
Human fertility is highlyvariable (figure 1).1 The highest recorded fertility for any
population in human history belongs to the Hutterites, a North American Ana-
baptist religious sect where, in the early twentieth century, married women
managed a remarkable average of almost 11 children each [2]. This contrasts
with recent fertility rates approaching just one child per women in some East
Asian populations2: Taiwan currently has the lowest national fertility rate of
1.1 children per woman [3]. These population-level averages, though divergent,
are dwarfed in comparison to individual-level variation in fertility. In some
Western European countries, a quarter of women remain childless, a character-
istic of this world region which extends back at least a couple of centuries [4].
Yet The Guinness Book of World Records 1998 claims one 18th century Russian
woman gave birth to 69 children [5], and there are historical accounts of power-
ful men fathering close to 1000 children [6,7]. The timing of childbearing also
varies dramatically. An average age at first birth in the late teens for women
was probably the case throughout most of human history, and still is in some
societies. But the current average age at first birth for women in the European
Union is 29 years, meaning that women wait half of their potential reproductive
lifespans before having their first child.3
How can we account for such variation? Fertility is clearly a very complex
trait, both physiologically and behaviourally determined. The total number of
children a woman ends up with depends on a number of pivotal ‘decisions’:
& 2016 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
 on January 10, 2017http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
whether to have children at all and, if so, when to have the
first child, whether and when to have subsequent children,
and when to stop. Such decisions may be taken by a
woman’s physiology, since sufficient energetic reserves
need to be available for successful reproduction. As does a
partner, at least in the absence of assisted reproductive tech-
nology. Consequently, direct fertility decisions are also
interwoven with more distal decisions about whether and
when to partner, who to partner with, whether to dissolve
a partnership, and whether and when to re-partner after dis-
solution. Fertility decisions will therefore be influenced by
both the physiological condition and behavioural strategies
of that partner. To add further complexity, in our social
species, fertility is influenced by other individuals, including
the availability and behaviour of our family and friends,
wider social norms surrounding reproduction, and insti-
tutional factors which influence many aspects of fertility,
family and work life, essentially providing the option set of
strategies available to individuals within a social context.
With so many ‘moving parts’, it is unsurprising that theories
of fertility are diverse.
Studying reproductive decision-making in humans,
unlike other species, offers the advantage that we can ask
our subjects about why they make the decisions they do.
Yet this advantage offers a false head-start: individuals can
behave in ways which may increase or decrease fertility with-
out conscious strategizing. The evidence is mixed on the
extent to which fertility decisions are consciously determined.
The existence of contraception and abortion throughout
recorded history is clear evidence for a desire to control
fertility under at least some circumstances [8]. Bledsoe’s ethno-
graphic research in the Gambia also suggests that couples in
small-scale societies engage in very active conscious strategiz-
ing about reproductive timing in order not to have births that
are too closely spaced [9]. On the other hand, Fisher’s qualitat-
ive research reconstructing British couples’ attitudes towards
fertility limitation during the early 20th century suggests a
distinct lack of such joint deliberation [10]. Further, women
in low-fertility countries who have good access to contracep-
tion and (in most populations) abortion seem surprisingly
inaccurate at controlling their fertility. Estimates for the pro-
portion of pregnancies which are unplanned are high in such
populations, approaching half of all pregnancies in both
Europe and theUS (e.g. [11]). But in addition to this unplanned
fertility, women in low-fertility populations tend to state pre-
ferences for more children than they actually end up having,
a phenomenon often referred to as an ‘unmet need for children’
[12], which suggests a failure to implement fertility desires.
Conscious strategizing may therefore play a limited role
with respect to the reproductive decision-making process,
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Figure 1. Variation in human fertility. (a) Distribution of total fertility rates or mean completed family sizes in 70 natural-fertility populations (solid line) and
70 controlled-fertility populations (dashed line). Note that natural fertility populations are highly variable. In fact, the range in fertility rates observed in natural
fertility populations exceeds the difference between the mean fertility rates observed in natural versus controlled settings. Figure redrawn from [1, p. 48].
Populations known to have high prevalences of pathological sterility are excluded. (b) A schematic of the ‘Demographic Transition Model’, which describes the
typical demographic shifts observed as populations undergo development from a pre-industrial to industrialized economic system. In stage one, total population
is low and stable due to high birth rates and high death rates. In stage two, total population rises as death rates fall following improvements in healthcare and
sanitation. Birth rates remain high. In stage three, total population is still rising rapidly, but fertility falls, narrowing the gap between birth and death rates. In stage
four, population growth stabilizes, balanced by a low birth rate and a low death rate.
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and even where it exists, care needs to be taken over its
interpretation, as consciousness may in fact be a post hoc
rationalization of what individuals have already done.
The social science of demography has engaged with the
question of why fertility varies for decades, initially focusing
on population-level trends. Theories of the fertility transition
(the decline in fertility which has followed, or happened in
tandem with, mortality decline and economic development
worldwide over the last few centuries: figure 1b) extend
back to the 1920s [13]. More recently, demographers have
attempted to explain population-level phenomena by trying
to understand individual behaviour. A vast body of research
now exists on fertility, documenting, describing, and partially
explaining why fertility varies so much between populations
and between individuals. Yet no holistic, comprehensive
understanding of why fertility varies has been reached. As a
result, fertility is still surprisingly hard to predict. A number
of unexpected fluctuations in fertility have occurred in high-
income populations since the Second World War (WWII):
from the sustained surge in fertility or ‘baby boom’ in the
immediate post-war decades, to a sharp decline in fertility
throughout the 1970s to below replacement levels, to recent
upticks in fertility in some high-income populations [14]. Ferti-
lity change in low- and middle-income populations has been
similarly unpredictable: fertility declines in some parts of
Asia and Latin America occurred faster than anticipated, and
there has been unanticipated stalling in the fertility decline in
some sub-Saharan African populations [15].
As is increasingly recognized in the demographic litera-
ture, an interdisciplinary approach is needed to help us
understand fertility variation in all its complexity. Demogra-
phy has an unusual relationship with theory, as it is defined
by the phenomena under study, rather than any particular
explanatory framework used by demographers [16–18]. The
best-known demographic theory—‘Demographic Transition
Theory’—, for example, is infamously not a causal theory at
all, but rather a descriptive account of the changes in fertility
and mortality which typically accompany economic develop-
ment. This theoretical agnosticism is actually beneficial in
many ways, in that it has freed the discipline to draw on mul-
tiple alternative disciplines and theoretical frameworks to help
explain demographic phenomena, mostly involving other
social sciences, particularly sociology and economics ([19]—
at least in the post-WWII period; pre-WWII demography and
biology were closely entwined [20]). This interdisciplinarity
has led to a useful and diverse body ofwork exploringwhy fer-
tility varies, and has helped to generate alternative hypotheses
which can be tested against or in concert with one another. The
European Fertility Project [21], for example, aimed to test econ-
omic versus sociological models of the demographic transition
against each other.
It has only been relatively recently, however, that concerted
attempts have been made to inform demographic thinking
with concepts from the natural sciences. Today, the subfield
of evolutionary demography is gaining ground, driven by the
acknowledgement of researchers from both natural and social
sciences that natural and social phenomena are interrelated,
and thus combining these approaches is essential for a holistic
explanation of demographic patterns [22–24]. Here, we outline
the key aims and assumption of the evolutionary demography
paradigm, highlighting the advances made during what
we describe as the ‘first wave’ of evolutionary demography
research on fertility that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.
We also use this section to highlight the differences between
evolutionary and non-evolutionary, or ‘conventional’, demo-
graphic research on fertility. Throughout this review, we refer
to conventional demography as what we perceive to be
widely shared opinions among many demographers on the
particular topic that we discuss, while acknowledging that
demography is a large and varied discipline, so that there is
no single conventional demographic view. This discussion
inevitably makes generalizations about both conventional
and evolutionary demography; both disciplines are much
more nuanced than this brief overview suggests, but we con-
sider that such high-level summaries can be very useful in
aiding interdisciplinary conversations by highlighting key
similarities and differences between fields. We further empha-
size that evolutionary and other approaches to demography
are complementary, and rather than being viewed as alterna-
tives should instead be seen as historically separate
perspectives which have much to contribute to each other.
We then go on to consider how contemporary research in evol-
utionary demography (or the ‘second wave’) has changed
focus and is making advances in new areas of research on fer-
tility, while highlighting the research reviewed and presented
in this special issue.
2. The first wave
Evolutionary demography is the application of theory from
evolutionary biology to demographic phenomena (fertility,
mortality and migration). In the context of fertility, life-history
theory and parental investment theory are the evolutionary
theories most commonly used [25,26]. In some regards,
evolutionary demography can be thought of as a hybrid disci-
pline, somewhere in between the natural and social sciences. It
sometimes adopts the ‘top-down’ approach of the natural
science of evolutionary biology, by testing specific hypotheses
derived from evolutionary theory (such as ‘is economic success
correlated with reproductive success?’, based on the hypo-
thesis from life-history theory that natural selection has
designed individuals to convert resources into offspring).
But, unlike evolutionary biology, evolutionary demography
also frequently adopts the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘object science’
approach of the social science of demography, which seeks to
explain a particular phenomenon (such as ‘why does fertility
vary?’). To date, evolutionary demography is perhaps better
known for its work on mortality, as there has been a successful
and sustained programme of research which aims to further
our understanding of mortality patterns and aging using an
evolutionary, cross-species approach [27]. As this suggests,
evolutionary demography is a discipline which is interested
in all species and has produced fascinating work on how mor-
tality and fertility rates vary between species (e.g. [28]). Here,
however, we focus exclusively on intra-species variation in
human fertility.
(a) The start of the first wave
One of the earliest evolutionary demographic studies, Blurton-
Jones’s ‘backload model’, tested the hypothesis that the length
of the birth intervals of !Kung hunter-gatherers allowed
women to balance optimally the energetic demands of child-
bearing and foraging in a society where women had to carry
small children and foraged foods substantial distances [29].
The assumption underlying this backload model is that the
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ultimate aim of birth intervals is to maximize child survival
and therefore evolutionary fitness (genetic representation in
future generations). This ultimate layer of explanation dis-
tinguishes evolutionary models from social science models,
which typically focus on ‘proximate explanations’, i.e. the
mechanismswhich bring behaviour about. Note that, through-
out, we use ‘proximate’ in the evolutionary, not demographic,
sense. In demography, proximate determinants of fertility are
the direct biological and behavioural influences on fertility
through which the ‘distal’ determinants of social, economic,
and cultural factors act ([30]; for example, the distal determinant
of educationmay influence fertility through the proximate dete-
minants of delayed marriage and higher contraceptive use). In
evolutionary terminology, both demographic proximate and
distal determinants would be considered proximate expla-
nations, since both are explanations for how fertility is brought
about. Neither of these types of explanations address why
these determinants influence fertility, since in evolutionary
biology this needs an ‘ultimate’ (also sometimes known as a
‘functional’) explanation, in terms of fitnessmaximization [31].4
The driving force behind evolutionary demography work
during the first wave was often a concern with ultimate expla-
nations of fertility variation, typically starting with the
prediction that fertility broadly functions to maximize fitness
in a particular ecology. This means that, though proximate
explanationswere not ignored, theywere not often the primary
focus of first wave work. For example, the substantial body of
work which demonstrated clear positive relationships between
wealth and fertility for both men and women (at least in high
fertility societies) derived from the life-history prediction
that individuals should use their resources in order to increase
reproductive success (reviewed in [32]). Determining exactly
how economic success led to reproductive success was
often a secondary concern in such studies. Note that this
means that evolutionary and non-evolutionary demographic
explanations for fertility are often entirely compatible, with
evolutionary demography adding a complementary layer of
explanation (in terms of fitness maximization) to social science
approaches focused on understanding the proximate expla-
nations of fertility [22]. This difference in focus—ultimate
versus proximate explanations—is no doubt one reason early
evolutionary demography did not make a significant dent on
the consciousness of conventional demography, but there
are some other differences in the aims of the two strands of
demography which may have limited cross-fertilization.
One of the strong emphases of first wave evolutionary
demography, due to its roots in anthropology, was in
explaining variation within societies with careful attention
to the ethnographic context in which fertility outcomes
were realized. Much first wave work on fertility therefore
focused on understanding individual-level variation in ferti-
lity in small-scale, high-fertility societies (sometimes
referred to by demographers as ‘natural-fertility’ popu-
lations) (but see [33,34]). This focus was influenced, in part,
by the desire of evolutionary researchers to understand the
evolutionary history of the human species. This emphasis
on small-scale societies, especially hunter-gatherers but also
subsistence agricultural, horticultural and pastoral popu-
lations (both contemporary and historical [35]), has been a
real strength of the discipline and provides a detailed
window onto the wide diversity of human fertility experi-
ences. First wave research largely interpreted the number of
children a woman produces in such societies as the result
of adaptations that calibrate fertility to a particular local
socio-ecology, taking into account the woman’s individual
‘state’ or condition. Variation in fertility is therefore a function
of differences in socio-ecology and differences in individual
condition. Socio-ecology refers to both the physical and
social environment, including cultural institutions (e.g. mar-
riage or inheritance system), which are at least sometimes
conceived of in this research as part of the ecology to which
fertility adapts (but see [36,37] for examples of evolutionary
work where cultural institutions are the focus of enquiry).
First wave work was therefore somewhat different in focus
than more conventional demographic approaches, which
have shown interest in investigating fertility in all kinds of
human population, though with a particular emphasis (at
least in contemporary demography) on analysis at the level
of the nation-state.
(b) The physiological regulation of fertility
Though the driving force behind evolutionary demographic
investigations is an interest in ultimate explanations, evolution-
ary demography has contributed quite substantially to the
study of proximate explanations in one particular area: the
role of energetic status in physiologically determining fertility.
For example, Blurton-Jones’s [29] model described above
assumes that energetic status influenced by backload is the
proximate determinant of birth spacing. Many evolutionary
demographers make the assumption that throughout most of
human history physiological mechanisms would probably
have been of paramount importance in determining fertility
(rather than any behavioural manipulation of fertility). In
fact, the new sub-discipline of reproductive ecology emerged
in the 1990s. This is an evolutionary discipline which has
explored relationships between energetic status and repro-
ductive physiology, particularly via hormonal mechanisms
[38–40]. Reproductive ecologists have now clearly demon-
strated that reproductive physiology responds to energetic
flux—not just the availability of energy but also energetic
expenditure—and have proposed that these are adaptive
responses that calibrate reproduction to the local environment.
Under conditions of energetic stress, reproduction should be
downregulated to avoid attempting a reproductive bout
which is likely to end in costly failure. In contrast, conventional
demography has paid less attention to the purely physiological
adjustment of fecundity to energetic status, and a few
demographers have even been rather sceptical of the claim
that energetic status has a significant impact on fertility
[1,41]. These demographers have argued that, despite the
evidence that reproductive physiology may respond to ener-
getic status, there is much less evidence that fertility itself is
strongly limited by energy balance, except under extreme
circumstances. This perspective may partly stem from the
observation that little between-population variation in fertility
can be attributed to energetic status, at least in contemporary
societies, where themost energetically constrained populations
clearly have the highest fertility.
(c) The behavioural regulation of fertility
The conventional demographic literature has focused largely
on the behavioural mechanisms which influence fertility. The
heuristics used to guide some of this work are also somewhat
different from those used in evolutionary demography: rather
than starting with the prediction that natural selection
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optimally matches fertility to the local ecology in natural
fertility societies, conventional demography has instead
posed the question, ‘why are high birth rates so low?’ [42].
This question arises from the ‘proximate determinants of fer-
tility’ framework, which suggests that fertility is surprisingly
low in natural-fertility populations because it is below the
physiological maximum which can be attained [30]. This
physiological maximum is thought to be 15 children, which
could be produced if women started having babies as soon
as they were physiologically able, continued to reproduce
until menopause, and spaced births without any breastfeed-
ing. This is not a heuristic an evolutionist is likely to have
come up with, as it assumes no post-partum parental invest-
ment, whereas all mammal species are committed to such
maternal investment through lactation. This has proved a
very useful heuristic in demography, however, as a framework
to decompose fertility into separate components. This allows
demographers to get a handle on why fertility varies between
populations by identifying which proximate determinants
vary between populations. Though the proximate determi-
nants include both physiological and behavioural factors, in
fact, the proximate determinants thought to have most power
to explain variation in fertility between populations are all be-
havioural: delayed marriage, use of contraceptives and
induced abortion, and lactational amenorrhoea (which is a
physiological determinant, but which is typically estimated
in empirical demographic work by measuring the duration
of breastfeeding [43]). Sociological demographers have also
noted that such behavioural mechanisms are often the focus
of cultural norms and have been interested in how variation
in cultural norms influences fertility, particularly in natural
fertility societies. For example, cultural norms for delayedmar-
riage are thought to be the route through which historical
Europe achieved fertility well below the physiological maxi-
mum, compared to norms which promote long periods of
lactation and post-partum sexual abstinence, which kept ferti-
lity relatively low in sub-Saharan Africa [44]. These norms are
assumed to act in the service ofmaintaining the physical health
and economic well-being of children, mothers and the wider
family, though only occasionally does such demographic
work explicitly consider why different cultural norms should
arise in different populations, or relate these cultural norms
back to features of the local ecology (see [45] for an example).
The first wave of evolutionary research also made inroads
into illuminating the behavioural regulation of fertility:
two edited volumes were published between the late 1980s
and mid 1990s which focused explicitly on human reproduc-
tive behaviour [46,47]. This work focused on how parental
investment decisions determine individual-level variation
in fertility. Such work has clear parallels in conventional
demography. For example, historical demography has
demonstrated how fertility responds at an individual level
to economic conditions, under the assumption that marriage
and fertility decisions will function to maintain the health
and economic well-being of families [48–50]. Parental invest-
ment theory, an influential body of theory which has been
developed in evolutionary biology, is a key theoretical frame-
work for much work in evolutionary demography [51–54].
Socio-ecology and individual condition determine patterns
of parental investment, which ultimately determines the
total number of children produced. Parental investment
decisions may include whether or not to invest in or continue
investing in a particular child (e.g. infanticide and
abandonment have both been common forms of disinvest-
ment historically and cross-culturally), and how much to
invest in a child (e.g. breastfeeding decisions and restricted
sexual activity aimed at prolonging birth intervals). Much
work during this period was produced by human behaviour-
al ecologists, whose goal is to explain variation in human
behaviour, including fertility behaviour, as a function of the
socio-ecological environment [55,56]. For example, Mace
[57] modelled how parental investment, specifically the
costs of launching children successfully onto the marriage
market, influenced the fertility of Gabbra pastoralists in
northern Kenya (a society which requires bride price, or the
transfer of resources from groom to bride’s family at mar-
riage). Her model suggested that in populations like the
Gabbra, where heritable wealth pays a substantial role in
determining offspring reductive success, maximizing fertility
will not necessarily maximize long-term fitness (i.e. it pays
parents to not just rely on physiological mechanisms to regu-
late fertility, but also use behavioural manipulation of fertility
to avoid producing too many children). Such theoretical
work is also supported by empirical evidence produced by
historical demographers in both historical Europe and, par-
ticularly, Asia, that marital fertility is lower than would be
expected from a purely physiological regulation of fertility,
which suggests fertility control within marriage, which may
function as a form of parental investment [58]. Further,
anthropological demographers have recently produced quali-
tative evidence that couples in high-fertility populations
consciously strategize about breastfeeding decisions and
sexual activity in order to manipulate the length of birth
intervals, and use local cultural norms flexibly in order to
do so [59]. Their stated rationale for such behaviour is exactly
as a life-history theorist would predict: to maximize the
health of each child but also the mother so that she can
conserve sufficient energy and health to manage her whole
reproductive lifespan optimally.
(d) The demographic transition
Parental investment theory is based on individual- or couple-
level cost-benefit analysis. One similarity between evolution-
ary and conventional demography is that both types of
models consider such cost-benefit analysis to be a key
factor in the fertility decline which occurs as part of the
demographic transition. Economic factors have always been
prominent in explaining the demographic transition, and
individual cost-benefit models emerged as the dominant
paradigm for explaining fertility decline in mid to late 20th
century demography [13,60–62]. These micro-economic
models assume that fertility started to decline as the costs
and benefits of children changed with industrialization
and mortality decline. Such models hinge on the intuitive
notion of a trade-off between the quantity and the quality
of offspring, and assume that parents gain more from
investing in the quality of children over their quantity as
mortality declines and populations develop economically.
Evolutionary demographers have also proposed that the
benefits of investing in the quality of children over quantity
increase during economic development. Conventional
demographers have often argued that fertility is kept high
in pre-demographic transition populations because parents
actually gain economically from producing children, who
provide valuable labour to their parents and are also a secure
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form of old-age insurance [62]. Evolutionary demographers, in
contrast, assume that, though childrenmay provide labour and
thus offset their own costs to some degree, they are always a net
economic drain on their parents, since evolutionary theory pre-
dicts that resources should always be used in the service of
reproduction, and not vice versa. During the first wave,
Kaplan [63] directly tested evolutionary versus demographic
‘wealth flows’ predictions about the economic value of chil-
dren in pre-transition societies, and concluded that children
never fully repaid their parents’ investment (see also [64], but
see [65]).
Evolutionarily speaking, it is a puzzle that industrialization
is correlated with a decrease in fertility, as a simple prediction
from life-history theory suggests that considerable increases
in resource availability should be converted into additional off-
spring. A small but steady stream of first wavework on fertility
decline was produced in an attempt to solve this puzzle.
Turke [66] suggested that industrialization increased the
costs of raising children, not just because raising children in
such economies required additional expenses, such as edu-
cation, but also because it changed the nature of childrearing.
Throughout most of human history, childrearing was coopera-
tive, with mothers, fathers, grandparents, and other family
members cooperating to feed and care for children [67].
As individuals became more mobile as industrialization
shifted the primary means of subsistence away from agricul-
ture and towards market employment, family networks
broke down. This made it harder to spread the costs of child-
rearing across extended kin, concentrating the costs of
reproduction on the parents, which may have prompted a
shift towards smaller families. Note, incidentally, that this
idea that humans are ‘cooperative breeders’ was in part
stimulated by evolutionary researchers asking why human
fertility was so high (in contrast to the demographic heuristic
that natural fertility rates are surprisingly low). We have
more rapid reproduction than our closely related ape cousins:
birth intervals are around 4–5 years for chimps and gorillas,
and 8 years for orangutans, whereas ours tend to be in
the range of 2–4 years [68]. This may be explained by our
cooperative system of reproduction, largely absent in other
apes [69,70].
This cooperative strategyof reproductionmaypartlyexplain
why cultural norms and social learning seem to be so important
in determining fertility behaviour (as conventional demogra-
phy has so clearly demonstrated). We may be particularly
sensitive to the behaviour of others, because the availability of
support to help us reproduce was vital for successful reproduc-
tion throughout our history. It may also pay to base
reproductive behaviour on observing the behaviour of others,
rather than use a trial-and-error approach, because births are
relatively rare and costly events, which leave little opportunity
to learn from trial and error. Not only do cultural institutions
(such as marriage and inheritance practices) influence our ferti-
lity by acting as part of our socio-ecology, but cultural norms
(such as breastfeeding practices, sexual behaviour, and the
acceptability of contraception) may play a more active role in
explaining why fertility is so variable between individuals
and populations, as they have the potential to change quite
rapidly over time. Only a small fraction of first wave work
showed an interest in cultural influences, however. The field
of cultural evolution emerged during the 1980s as a subfield
of the evolutionarybehavioural sciences,which explicitly recog-
nizes the importance of culture in determining human
behaviour, but which also recognizes that cultural evolution
may follow trajectories that are not tightly constrained by
biological evolution [71–75]. A leading text in this work [72]
tackled the demographic transition puzzle, suggesting that
our cognitive biases towards emulating the rich and
famous—orat least high-statusmembers of our local social net-
works—may drive the shift towards low fertility. According to
this account, once newmeans of gaining status emergedwhich
competed with the production of children, then high status
began to be associated with lower fertility than average,
which could then have been copied by lower-status individuals
via a process called ‘prestige-biased’ cultural transmission.
Although such work provided novel theoretical explanations
for the fertility decline, little empirical research was produced
during the first wave to support or refute such cultural
evolutionary explanations.
(e) The end of the first wave
In summary, the first wave in the 1980s and 1990s saw a
considerable body of evolutionary research on fertility
emerge that was largely focused on ultimate explanations of
fertility as well as explaining within-population variation in
small-scale, natural-fertility societies. Alongside this work
were a number of papers aimed at explaining the fertility tran-
sition, both proposing evolutionary explanations for this
apparent puzzle, and testing some of these models. Arguably,
the culmination of the first wave of evolutionary demography
is marked by three significant publications which provide
useful summaries of the insights gained by this stage, laying
a solid foundation for the research which would follow.
First, 1995 saw the publication of the landmark book ‘Ache
life history: the ecology and demography of a foraging people’, by the
anthropologists Hill & Hurtado [76]. Summarizing the results
of many years of field research among a population of South
American foragers, the book remains one of the most in-
depth studies of life-history decisions in a natural fertility
population ever conducted. It followed in the footsteps
of previous anthropologists who had produced thorough
demographic accounts of small-scale societies [77], but by the
mid-1990s both evolutionary theory and demographic
methods were sufficiently advanced that Hill & Hurtado
could produce an impressively comprehensive and sophisti-
cated analysis of the life history of a particular population.
Their work included attempts to understand the mechanisms
underlying fertility variation (e.g. the relationship between
nutritional status and fertility) and to assess evidence for the
optimization of key life-history trade-offs, such as those
between growth and reproduction and between fertility and
child survival (see also [78] for a similar, though less compre-
hensive, examination of the evolutionary demography of an
African pastoralist population from wave one). Ache life history
was hugely influential, not least because it marked a shift
towards increasing methodological sophistication as Hill &
Hurtado capitalized on new statistical methods being devel-
oped in demography and other social sciences. It effectively
demonstrated the potential of an evolutionary and ethnogra-
phically informed approach to yield insights into multiple
questions about human reproductive behaviour.
Second, in 1996, Hillard Kaplan developed a comprehen-
sive evolutionary model of fertility variation, incorporating
evolutionary parental investment theory, the proximate
determinants of fertility framework, and micro-economic
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:20150144
6
 on January 10, 2017http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
models of human capital inspired by the work of Gary
Becker, to explain fertility variation across both traditional
natural-fertility populations and modern low-fertility popu-
lations [79]. According to Kaplan, in small-scale societies
similar to those in which our ancestors evolved, the returns
to parental investment in an offspring’s adult productivity
reach diminishing returns relatively quickly, whereas in
modern wage-labour economies returns to investment in off-
spring do not diminish until higher levels—particularly for
those with higher levels of embodied capital in the modern
form of education. In consequence, the psychology that had
evolved to detect diminishing returns leads modern parents
to invest more in a smaller number of children, with decisions
to invest more in each child leading to a particular number of
children. Modernization is also accompanied by novel con-
ditions where offspring survival is virtually guaranteed and
where few individuals have insufficient resources to repro-
duce, providing little check on the motivation for high child
investments. Consequently, modern fertility declines below
fitness-maximizing levels, but can nevertheless be under-
stood as the product of previously adaptive mechanisms.
Kaplan supported this ‘maladaptive’ hypothesis with data
showing that fertility limitation in modern populations
advances offspring educational attainment and adult
income, but does not increase offspring survival or fertility
[80]. In contrast, other evolutionary demographers at this
time suggested that modern low fertility could in fact be
adaptive provided that strong socio-economic advantages
are transmitted across generations that safeguard future gen-
erations from levels of poverty or disease that would limit
their reproduction (e.g. [81]).
Finally, in 1998, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder published a
short but highly influential review of evolutionary expla-
nations for the puzzling decline of fertility in the later stages
of the demographic transition, which provided a useful
summary of current thinking, encompassing Kaplan’s model
but also burgeoning insights in the field of cultural evolution
[82]. Borgerhoff Mulder identified three main evolutionary
hypotheses for this phenomenon present in the literature:
low fertility could be explained (i) by life-history models
which predict that in competitive environments investing in
few high-quality offspring can be fitness-maximizing over
the long-term; (ii) as a consequence of cultural evolutionary
processes which may divert fertility away from fitness-
maximization [72]; or (iii) by ‘adaptive-lag’ arguments which
suggest that modern low fertility is the result of cognitive
mechanisms that are out of step with modern environments
(broadly, the category into which Kaplan’s model falls).
Borgerhoff Mulder’s review set a clear agenda for future
research then undertaken in the second wave, which sub-
sequently placed focus on both testing mutually exclusive
predictions of these alternative hypotheses, and/or worked
to integrate their complementary aspects.
All three of these publications also clearly identified the
need for evolutionary demographers to further develop theor-
etical accounts beyond fitness maximization models to provide
a comprehensive explanation ofwhy fertility varies so dramati-
cally between and within populations. In fact, despite the
common assumption by evolutionary demographers that ferti-
lity maximizes fitness in natural-fertility populations, the
possibility began to emerge from the latter stages of first
wave work, including Hill & Hurtado, that fertility even in
natural-fertility populations may be lower than would
seemingly maximize individual fitness [83]: the few direct
tests of the hypothesis that fertility maximized fitness found
that the women who had produced the most children in a par-
ticular population also had the highest fitness. This suggests
that the majority of women in that population who were not
reproducing at the maximum fertility were not maximizing fit-
ness, which leads to the question of why they did not produce
more children. This conclusion set up a variety of challenges,
which are subsequently being taken up in the second wave
of evolutionary research on fertility. One challenge was to
determine if fertility rates do, in fact, maximize fitness in natu-
ral fertility populations and if so, then what was wrong with
first wave measures of fitness (were they too short-term, or
missing some vital component, such as not taking sufficient
account of individual variation in state, or condition?). And if
observed fertility rates do not maximize fitness, then why
not, and what is a better model of fertility variation? This
leads to the need formodels that integrate explanatory hypoth-
eses with a more detailed understanding of proximate factors
affecting fertility. As we describe below, the second wave has
responded to these challenges, both by expanding consider-
ation of the factors influencing fertility at proximate and
ultimate levels, and by methodological and theoretical
advancements refining the measurement of fitness and our
understanding of adaptation.
3. The second wave
This volume highlights emerging research in the second wave
of evolutionary demographic research on fertility, reflecting
developments since the late 1990s. If the first wave focused
heavily on interpreting fertility in terms of fitness maximiza-
tion, the second aims to develop a broader understanding of
fertility variation (without losing sight of the evolved nature
of human physiology and behaviour), which includes (1) a
much greater focus on the psychological and cultural mechan-
isms underlying fertility variation, (2) a more explicit
recognition of the complexity and multi-causal nature of ferti-
lity variation, (3) greater emphasis on fertility decisions in
developed nations and low-fertility populations (see also
[84]), and (4) greater methodological sophistication, including
multigenerational, cross-cultural, and comparative research.
These trends involve, and require, evolutionary demography
to engagemore activelywith thewider demographic literature.
The study of low-fertility societies, for example, largely absent
from first wave research, can build on the very substantial body
of demographicwork on this topic (see [85] for a review). In the
subsections below, we highlight key trends as exemplified by
the papers in this issue.
(a) Optimizing offspring
As described above, the first wave made significant steps into
identifying and addressing the evolutionary puzzle of the
demographic transition. A distinguishing feature of the
second wave has been the further elaboration of these expla-
nations, adding complexity and new and more sophisticated
empirical tests of existing hypotheses, and in some cases chal-
lenging and re-examining certain stylized facts about the
nature of demographic transitions more or less commonly
accepted during the first wave. For example, until recently,
debate concerning whether or not modern low fertility can be
considered fitness-maximizing across the long term has been
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thwarted by the lack of multigenerational analyses capable of
tracking the long-term impacts of fertility limitation. Goodman
et al. [86] recently resolved this debate by compiling data across
four generations of a Swedish-born cohort born during the
demographic transition, including not only data on descendant
mortality, fertility, and success of the marriage market, but
also school test performance, educational progression and
adult income. They confirmed Kaplan’s proposal [79,80]
that fertility limitation is associated with notable and far-
reaching benefits to descendant-embodied capital in the
form of socio-economic success, particularly among initially
wealthy lineages, but has little impact on descendant repro-
ductive success. These results suggest mathematical models
showing that low fertility could hypothetically maximize indi-
vidual fitness across the long term in modern settings are
unrealistic [81,87].
Following in this vein, our special issue begins with four
papers that revisit some of the dominant themes of the first
wave in the light of theoretical and empirical developments.
Kaplan’s [79] model of fertility variation focused on how
changes in the way in which humans produce wealth can
prompt fertility decline. Shenk et al. [88] develop these ideas
further, specifically by adding an extra layer in terms of
status, defined as relative social rank within a society. Status
was not ignored in first wave work, given it is closely linked
to resource availability [81,89–91], but newer models [87,88]
draw strongly on insights from a larger empirical literature in
evolutionary demography including new research on status
in small-scale societies (e.g. [92,93]) and are also able to use
modern computational power to more extensively explore
the parameter space of models. Shenk et al.’s model allows
parents to optimize investment in both the embodied capital
(defined on an absolute scale) and the status/rank of their off-
spring (defined relative to others). The model finds that in
conditions common in demographic transition societies,
parents are predicted to increase investment in both embodied
capital and social status, with each type of investment leading
to separate and significant decreases in fertility, particularly
under conditions of high inequality and intense status compe-
tition. Such models may help explain why fertility decline gets
started with the shift towards modern market economies, why
it is maintained under such ecological conditions, andwhy fer-
tility decline might deepen if economic development leads to
greater inequality or status competition.
Stulp & Barrett [94] also consider the relationship between
wealth and fertility in modern populations—long considered
the ‘central theoretical problem of sociobiology’ [95]. While
first wave research clearly showed a positive relationship
between wealth and fertility in natural fertility populations,
influential papers in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggested
that the relationship between wealth and fertility switched
during the fertility transition to become negative [95,96].
Evolutionarily, this is hard to explain, as individuals are
predicted to use their resources in the service of increasing
their reproductive success. Here, Stulp & Barrett question the
validity of the cross-sectional samples used to assess the
relationship between wealth and fertility, particularly those
presented in the influential articles of Pe´russe [96] and
Vining [95]. They find that even in post-transition societies, fer-
tility is still largely positively correlated with wealth when
longitudinal datasets are appropriately analysed. They note,
here and elsewhere, that these relationships are complex,
however [97,98]. They may be stronger for men than for
women and may vary between groups within complex
societies (such as different ethnicities), suggesting that it is
important to not treat modern complex societies as a uniform
whole, but to address, and use, variation within societies
when testing evolutionary hypotheses. They further question
the assumption that the wealth-striving behaviour of humans
in industrial population reflects the distortion of a universal
evolved predisposition, and suggest that much economic
behaviour can be better interpreted in terms of risk manage-
ment and reduction. They also caution that a broadly
positive relationship between wealth and fertility does not
mean that post-transition societies are maximizing their
fertility, and urge that careful attention must be paid to the
origin and historical trajectory of social institutions (i.e. their
cultural evolution) when trying to explain the fertility
transition. For example, institutions can make a significant
difference to the costs and benefits of children, as they illustrate
with child labour laws: legislation keeping children out of
the labour market (or in it) substantially influences the
costs and benefits of raising children. Understanding how
such legislation comes into being is therefore an important
part of understanding variation in fertility, often neglected
by evolutionary demographers.
Lawson & Borgerhoff Mulder [99] revisit the notion—
common to both evolutionary and economic demography—
that variation in fertility can be understood as the
optimization of a trade-off between offspring quantity and
quality. They highlight ways in which simple fitness-
maximization models built on this foundation, while useful
heuristically, poorly reflect the complex reality of fertility
decisions. Reviewing the literature on quantity–quality
trade-off effects in traditional populations characteristic of
our evolutionary past, they then put forward the argument
that while the optimization of the quantity–quality trade-
off may be fundamental in defining the upper limits of
human fertility and the shared features of human repro-
ductive physiology, trade-offs between reproductive and
somatic effort and between fertility and mating effort, prob-
ably play a more pivotal role in accounting for fertility
variation in settings characteristic of our evolutionary past.
They argue that the trade-off between the perceived quality
and quantity of offspring is more obviously relevant to indi-
vidual decisions to reduce fertility in modern low-fertility
populations. Yet, just as this trade-off becomes relevant, fertility
behaviour apparently becomes maladaptive, yielding no appar-
ent benefits in termsof long-termreproductive success [50].With
little indication of the tactical balancing of the quantity–quality
trade-off in pre-demographic transition environments, Lawson
& Borgerhoff Mulder suggest the demographic transition pre-
sents a potentially radical shift in the nature of reproductive
decision-making.This is aconclusion that raises interestingques-
tions about the flexibility of human behaviour in rapidly
changing environments, and highlights the need for more a
sophisticated understanding of the proximate mechanisms
underlying human reproduction.
One conclusion from Lawson & Borgerhoff Mulder [99] is
that models of fertility, in both pre- and post-demographic
transition contexts need to better incorporate the complexities
of sequential reproductive bouts and sexual reproduction.
One complexity often lacking is the need to incorporate
both reproductive partners in fertility decision-making. Men
do sometimes appear in demographic accounts of fertility,
though conventional demographic research traditionally
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focuses heavily on women, as noted in one review article:
‘Demography has regarded men as important economically
but as typically uninvolved in fertility except to impregnate
women and to stand in the way of their contraceptive use’
[100, p. 83]. This quote also illustrates a long-standing assump-
tion among many demographers that men may be responsible
for high fertility in some situations, as they dictate reproductive
decisions and exploit female labour by insisting on large
families. Some evolutionary researchers have similarly con-
sidered that men may have higher fertility desires than
women, based on theoretical expectations of sexual conflict
between men and women, such that men may benefit from
pushing women into rapid reproduction which may endanger
women’s own health.
Moya et al. [101] examine these evolutionary claims closely
and use theoretical models to show that universally higher fer-
tility preferences among men as compared to women is
unlikely to be explained through evolutionary sexual conflict.
Only in specific circumstances where men can remarry quickly
and easily, andwithout substantial costs, are male fertility pre-
ferences high enough to risk wearing out their first wife with
excessive childbearing likely to evolve. Such conditions are
relatively rare, though particularly high ‘quality’ men, who
are very attractive on the marriage market, may be able to
repartner quickly. This article also calls for evolutionary
social scientists to build more precise models of reproductive
decision-making. Firstly, if sexual conflict is to be used to
help explain fertility, then the precise conditions that are
required for this sexual conflict to arise need to be carefully
specified (Moya et al.’s models even show that women can
prefer higher fertility to men under certain circumstances).
Secondly, they show that fitness maximization arguments are
unlikely to explain the empirical observation that men do
have higher fertility preferences than women in the majority
of those populations where the sexes differ (and often the
sexes are in agreement), so that other factors, such as misfiring
psychology, which is out of sync with modern environments,
or cultural evolution need to be incorporated in understanding
sex differences in fertility intentions.
All the papers in this section continue the first wave
focus on understanding the ultimate explanations
for fertility variation, since none directly investigate proxi-
mate mechanisms. All, however, conclude that fitness-
maximization arguments, while useful, cannot fully explain
fertility variation; that more complex models, incorporating
several different dimensions of fitness maximization are
necessary; and that the proximate mechanisms need to
be examined much more closely in evolutionary work in
order to understand how and why fertility deviates from
fitness maximization, since even the most complex, multi-
dimensional fitness-maximization model is very unlikely to
be able to explain contemporary low fertility.
(b) Getting a better handle on behavioural mechanisms
Second wave research has begun to show a more dedica-
ted interest in the behavioural determinants of fertility, and
not just those related to parental investment decisions.
Hruschka & Burger [102] clearly demonstrate the importance
of understanding behavioural mechanisms to interpret fertility
in low fertility societies. They use a simple statistical method to
explore how variance in fertility changes over the demographic
transition in order to shed light on the key determinants
of individual and population differences in fertility. Their
analysis of Demographic and Health Survey Program data
suggests, somewhat provocatively, that the vast majority of fer-
tility variation within high-fertility societies is simply due to
random timing of events—or at least, their results suggest
that this is the most parsimonious explanation. This implies
that within many populations, between-individual differences
in neither physiological condition nor behavioural regulation
of fertility make as much of a difference to the number of chil-
dren women produce as it is often thought that they might.
This is most notable in high-fertility societies as well as many
societies in the midst of fertility transitions. In contrast, their
analysis suggests that in the small number of low-fertility
societies examined in their analyses, women are aiming at a
limited number of targeted family sizes, consistent with the
view that there is tighter behavioural control over fertility in
such populations.
The psychologicalmechanismsunderlying fertility decision-
making are remarkably understudied, in any discipline.
McAllister et al. [103] here provide the first comprehensive
review of the interdisciplinary literature that does exist on this
topic. These authors draw together the theorieswhich are begin-
ning to spring up to explain reproductive decision-making.
These are diverse, including life-history theory from evolu-
tionary biology [104], attachment theory [105] and terror
management theory [106] from psychology, and the theory of
planned behaviour [107], which is increasingly being used in
demography, building on limited interest in the psychology
of fertility in earlier work in this discipline [108–110]. They
then review the empirical literature which has used these
theories as frameworks to direct empirical research. The benefits
of social psychology methods, especially the experimental
manipulation of fertility preferences in the laboratory, are con-
trasted against their use with rather biased samples, such as
university students. However, such work does suggest that
psychological mechanisms may mediate variation in fertility
between individuals and populations. For example, experimen-
tal work has suggested that cues to childhood stress, father
absence, and mortality all lead to predictable shifts in fertility
preferences. This reviewalso suggests that personalitymaymed-
iate fertility behaviour, though in complexways: the relationship
between personality and fertility differs between men and
women [111], and also cross-culturally [112].
This psychological work is so far rather fragmented. It is
dispersed across several fields, which use different theoreti-
cal models, and which have not so far integrated well with
one another. This research has also so far been conducted
exclusively on high-income, low-fertility populations; only
ethnographic, qualitative evidence is available from higher-
fertility populations on the cognition underlying reproductive
decisions. This area is therefore ripe for further research. We
hope that McAllister’s valuable review article will stimulate
greater interest in, and multi-disciplinary development of,
this area of research on the psychological mechanisms which
underlie reproductive decision-making.
Alongside the glimmerings of an interest in psychological
mechanisms has been the more substantial development of
the field of cultural evolution of fertility. Colleran [113] pro-
vides the first review of cultural evolutionary hypotheses of
fertility. There has been considerable emphasis in the conven-
tional demographic literature on the importance of cultural
norms, including consideration of how social influence
may influence fertility decisions via social networks (e.g.
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[114–116]). But there has been little cross-fertilization so far
between this literature and evolutionary approaches to cul-
ture. Such cross-fertilization could be useful because there
has been little formal theory in the demographic work
on cultural influences on fertility; cultural evolutionary
approaches can therefore provide a much-needed set of
formal models from which new predictions can be derived.
Colleran’s review echoes the theme emerging from second
wave research that multi-causal explanations for fertility
are essential. She argues that cultural evolution approaches
need to be integrated with other approaches to fully under-
stand fertility variation;—there has been a tendency in both
evolutionary and conventional demography for work on
economic models of individual cost-benefit analysis and cul-
tural models to develop in parallel rather than together. Yet
neither cost-benefit analysis nor cultural influences act inde-
pendently of one another, as Colleran highlights by
emphasizing conceptual overlaps between cultural evolution-
ary models and human behavioural ecology: cultural
evolutionary models, for example, do include cost-benefit
analysis as just one of a suite of psychological adaptations
for learning about environmental and other cues. Cultural
evolutionary research emphasizes the coevolution of econ-
omic and cultural systems and uses a multilevel approach,
which recognizes that individual strategies for adaptation
within groups and competition between groups often co-
occur (e.g. [117–119]). Colleran specifically recommends
closer attention be paid to the distinct processes which lead
to the origin, spread, and maintenance of fertility decline.
The evolutionary research on psychological mechanisms
and cultural evolution has so far been somewhat distinct,
yet these two fields are clearly closely related (as has been
recognized in other second wave work, e.g. [120,121]). While
reproductive decision-making will involve individual cost-
benefit analysis, cultural factorswill influence these calculations
in a variety of ways. Arguably, conventional demography
is ahead of evolutionary demography here: theories which
have recently been incorporated into demographic models of
reproductive decision-making, the theories of planned behav-
iour [122] and conjunctural action [123], take into account
both individual characteristics and social influence. In this
issue, Bentley et al. [124] take a step forward for the evolutionary
sciences by combining individual decision-making and social
influence in their theoretical model of reproductive decision-
making. Their model incorporates both the information
on which individuals base their decisions (specifically, how
transparent are the costs and benefits of decisions), and the
recognition that an individual’s decisions are contingent on
social influence to a greater or lesser degree. The authors then
identify ways in which these two dimensions of transparency
and social influence may interact to produce different domains
of decision-making relevant for different types of reproductive
decisions.
(c) Developmental influences and reproductive timing
One relatively neglected aspect in conventional demography is
the influence of early-life environment on fertility. We are a
long-lived species with a long childhood, and much of the
social learning which influences our later behaviour is devel-
oped during childhood. Developmental influences on fertility
were not ignored in first wave demographic research
[125–128]. Much of this literature, motivated by life history
theory, examines whether the childhood environment cana-
lizes our reproductive trajectories into either ‘fast’ or ‘slow’
life histories/courses. This literature hypothesizes that grow-
ing up in a poor environment kickstarts a fertility strategy
which involves early sexual debut and first reproduction as
well as rapid subsequent reproduction with resulting high fer-
tility. In contrast, a benign environment is predicted to lead to
later reproduction (so that individual capital can be built up
before reproducing), slower reproduction (because the chances
of both self and children surviving are higher), a smaller
number of children born overall, but not necessarily more
surviving children. Early-life environment has not been
entirely neglected in conventional demographic approaches.
This life-history work has parallels with the ‘weathering
hypothesis’ in the demographic literature, which argues that
growing up in poor environments means that first births
should be early so that women can reproduce while they
(and their mothers, whom they rely on for childrearing help)
are still healthy [129,130]. The weathering hypothesis tends to
be restricted to explaining ethnic differences in childbearing
in the US, however, and has not been widely used outside
this context. Life-history models, in contrast, can be general-
ized across different contexts to explain fertility differences
across socio-economic strata.
Coall et al. [131] provide the first review of the evidence
that childhood experiences influence subsequent fertility out-
comes. There is suggestive evidence that stressful childhood
environments lead to earlier reproductive development and
timing [132]; however, the evidence is lacking on whether
early-life environment influences fecundity and fertility in
later life (but see [133]). Therefore, the evidence regarding
whether early stress results in women having higher numbers
of children overall is inconclusive. Further, the influence of
early environments on fertility has almost exclusively been
studied in high-income, low-fertility populations (for an
exception, see [134]). In populations which are resource-
stressed, it may be that growing up in harsh environments
delays, rather than accelerates, first reproduction, because of
the constraints imposed by very low access to resources
[127]. The mechanisms which result in early stress leading
to earlier reproduction have also not been studied in detail.
In their review, Coall et al. focus on the physiological mech-
anisms which may mediate these relationships and suggest
potential roles for birth weight, childhood body composition,
risky health behaviours, and developmental influences on
attractiveness. Again, this is an area in its infancy that has
good prospects for subsequent investigation.
As this review clearly demonstrates, there is a large body
of research on age at first birth in evolutionary demography.
This is a key reproductive decision in evolutionary biology, as
it marks the life history shift from growth to reproduction.
As noted by Towner et al. [135], however, age at last birth
has received relatively little attention. While there has been
some relevant work in the historical demography literature,
it is the least well studied of all the components of fertility
(age at first birth, length of birth intervals, age at last birth,
and childlessness). In evolutionary demography, the literature
has been dominated by interest in the evolution of menopause
[136]. Though we have concentrated in this review on individ-
ual variation in fertility, one of the successes of first wave
evolutionary demography was to consider how evolution has
shaped our species-typical life history. In particular, influential
work was produced suggesting that menopause, a life-history
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trait almost unique to humans, may have evolved because of
our cooperative system of reproduction: the grandmother
hypothesis suggests older women benefit more from investing
in existing children and grandchildren than continuing to pro-
duce children of their own [136,137]. Towner et al. refocus
evolutionary attention on individual variation in age at
last birth. They provide clear evidence in their review of the
literature, and their Bangladeshi case study, that age at last
birth typically precedes menopause by a decade or more.
This begs the questions: why stop early?; and does stopping
early represent an important strategic behaviour in fertility
decision-making? Towner et al. also review both the proxi-
mate and ultimate explanations for variation in age at last
birth, and suggest this is another area ripe for research in
evolutionary demography.
(d) Emerging trends
The final three papers in our volume reflect notable emerging
trends where we are particularly keen to see continued devel-
opment. As we have described above, second wave research
has maintained an interest in understanding variation within
high-fertility populations, but has also become increasingly
interested in the demographic transition and in low-fertility
settings. As part of this trend, one particularly welcome devel-
opment is the growing body of field studies on ‘transitioning’
populations currently undergoing economic development
and the fertility decline [138–140]. This includes research into
the uptake of modern contraceptive technology, which has
now been analysed both in terms of its consequences for
child health and in relation to cultural transmission
[141–144]. There have also been a number of studies examining
how parents navigate parental investment decisions when
faced with (evolutionarily) novel conditions, such as sudden
declines in childmortality [145] or the rapid increases in oppor-
tunities to invest in formal education [146,147]. We encourage
further research of this kind because it is only by focusing our
attention on populations actively undergoing substantial
economic development that we are likely to achieve a compre-
hensive understanding of how reproductive decision-making
changes as populations modernize. Such research also provi-
des an opportunity to provide a more precise understanding
of adaptive lag in fertility decisions, which most researchers
now agree is fundamental to evolutionary explanations of the
demographic transition—but is rarely studied directly. Finally,
this work offers opportunities for more active engagement
with the policy-orientated focus of many conventional
demographic researchers interested in better understanding
how populations may be encouraged to alter reproductive
behaviours to the benefit of maternal and child health.
Another trend we are keen to promote is comparative
research. Comparative research offers potential for rigorous
testing of hypotheses for why fertility varies between popu-
lations. The second wave is beginning to produce such work
[148,149]. Such empirical work is enabled by the increasing
availability of data across the full spectrum of human popu-
lations, and the increasingly high quality of datasets,
including multigenerational datasets [86,150,151]; along with
advances in statistical techniques in the social sciences, which
can be used to analyse such large and complex datasets.
Snopkowski et al. [152] illustrate trends in both comparative
work and field research on transitional populations. The
authors examine education, a strong negative predictor of
fertility cross-culturally, which has received considerable atten-
tion by demographers [153]. Snopkowski et al. examine five
pathways throughwhich education is posited to affect fertility,
performing the same analysis across three populations moving
through the fertility transition. They find some commonalities
and also some differences across societies, suggesting both that
education is probably such an important predictor of fertility
cross-culturally because it operates through multiple causal
pathways, but also that these pathways may be turned on or
off (or tuned up or down) in different socio-ecological circum-
stances. Such comparative research offers exciting possibilities
to rigorously test hypotheses, informed by the detailed anthro-
pological knowledge of researchers who have collected these
datasets or worked in these populations. This complements
comparativeworkmorewidespread in conventional demogra-
phy, using databases such as the Demographic and Health
Surveys, which has the advantage of larger sample size and
more populations to compare, but the downside of less-
detailed ethnographic knowledge (such that some variables
may not be appropriate or easily interpretable, and other
key variables may be missing) and less-homogeneous popu-
lations (such that analyses are vulnerable to the ecological
fallacy, i.e. erroneous inferences made from aggregated data
which misrepresent relationships between variables within
communities or ethnic groups) [154,155].
Recent years have also witnessed renewed interest in how
best to measure fitness and in using demographic data to
assess how selection is currently acting on the human pheno-
type, particularly in modern post-demographic transition
settings. Mortality has been reduced to such low levels in
many parts of the world, and postponed almost entirely into
old age, that differential mortality may no longer be very
important in driving natural selection. Differential fertility
may now be the primary engine of natural selection in post-
demographic transition societies [156]. This raises the question
of how best to measure fitness, since different measures can
come up with different results (see [157,158] for an example
of different measures of fitness resulting in exactly opposite
conclusions using the same dataset). In this issue, Ewbank
[159] highlights that reproductive timing matters (see also
[160,161]), as failing to take into account the generational
nature of reproduction may lead to the mismeasurement of fit-
ness, particularly in humans and other long-lived organisms.
Short-term measures of fitness may also be overly sensitive to
the failure to reproduce, yet childlessness is found in nearly
all human societies and has become quite common post-demo-
graphic transition. This meanswe need tomove beyond simple
‘baby counting’ and attempt to acknowledge and incorporate
population-level demographic processes in a more formal
manner than has been common in evolutionary demography.
There is also clearly a need for evolutionary demographers to
incorporate indirect fitness into their models, since our coop-
erative system of reproduction means that indirect fitness
may be particularly important in our species (indirect fitness
is achieved not through one’s own reproduction but through
that of one’s genetic relatives).
Finally, Burger & De Long [162] end our issue with a
number of potential avenues for future research, by making
predictions about how fertility may change in the future.
They speculate that the very low and below-replacement-
level fertility which characterizes high-income populations
may not be permanent (see also [163]). In contrast to the
assumption of demographic transition theory that fertility
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only ever falls once it begins to decline, fertility decline has
previously reversed during the baby boom of the 1960s,
and a number of very high-income populations have seen
recent upticks in fertility [14]. Burger & De Long have several
suggestions for those predicting future trends in fertility.
First, models should take into account the possibility of natu-
ral selection increasing the frequency of traits associated with
high fertility; natural selection, after all, operates on fitness
and individuals with few or no children leave fewer genetic
contributions to future generations. It is also possible that cul-
tural norms may spread which are associated with higher,
rather than lower, fertility. The authors argue that high
levels of wealth inequality, both within and between
societies, may result in fertility remaining high in less-well-
resourced populations and sub-populations (a finding
consistent with that of Shenk et al. [88]). Finally, Burger &
De Long suggest that changes in cultural institutions that
allow women to meet the high opportunity costs of reproduc-
tion they face in modern market economies (such as paid
maternity leave and affordable childcare) may also contribute
to increases in fertility.
4. Conclusion
Evolutionary demography assumes that understanding that
our physiology, psychology, and behaviour have evolved
over time through the process of natural selection allows
insights into why fertility varies so widely, and how such
variation arises from local social and environmental contexts.
We have argued that the first wave of evolutionary demogra-
phy focused on testing hypotheses derived from the core
principles of an evolutionary framework, specifically that
variation in fertility can be interpreted as adaptive variation
which functions to optimize reproductive success in various
socio-ecological settings. While this proved a useful heuristic
in understanding some aspects of fertility, such as age at first
birth and length of birth intervals, conclusive evidence that
total fertility is fitness-maximizing in natural-fertility societies
was not forthcoming. First wave research also suggested that
fertility decline probably cannot be interpreted as adaptive,
though it may be influenced by psychological and cultural
mechanisms which were adaptive in previous environments.
The second wave, in contrast, focuses on fleshing out evol-
utionary demographic models to deal with the complex
reality of fertility behaviour, as well as more meaningfully
integrating our work across populations, evolutionary sub-
fields, and neighbouring disciplines. All papers in this
volume tackle head-on the complexities involved in analysing
fertility, particularly the transition from high to low fertility
which universally seems to follow, or occasionally co-occur
with, mortality decline and economic development. The
second wave is thus energetically investigating the un-
answered questions from, and attempting to meet the
challenges revealed in, the first wave. This is an exceptional
time in the history of the evolutionary social sciences in gen-
eral, and evolutionary demography in particular, with
increasing acceptance and wide publication of research
from the evolutionary human sciences in evolutionary
biology, general science, and social science journals. We
expect that the next decade or two are likely to bring even
greater methodological sophistication, including significantly
more comparative and cross-cultural work, and greater theor-
etical integration with the social sciences. In the coming
years, we hope to see evolutionary demography increasingly
integrated in the conversations and journals of conventional
demography and other social sciences, as we believe that
the methodological rigour of demography and the theoretical
clarity of evolutionary biology make a powerful combination.
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Endnotes
1We will follow social science usage in referring to the production of
children as fertility, and the ability to conceive as fecundity, in
contrast to biology, which reverses the meaning of these two terms.
2‘fertility rates’ refer to ‘total fertility rates’, a population estimate of
the number of children expected for a women surviving throughout
her reproductive years (assumed to be 15–49 years of age in the
demographic literature) given current age-specific fertility rates.
3http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6829228/3-
13052015-CP-EN.pdf/7e9007fb-3ca9-445f-96eb-fd75d6792965.
4A simple example of the difference between proximate and ultimate
explanations can be illustrated with the question, ‘why do we eat?’. A
proximate answer to that question is: we eat because we feel physio-
logical sensations which tell us that we’re hungry. An ultimate
answer is: we eat because if we did not regularly take in food we
would die, and dying tends to dramatically reduce evolutionary
fitness.
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